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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Closure of Trials - The
Press and the Public Have a First Amendment Right
of Access to Attend Criminal Trials, Which Cannot
Be Closed Absent an Overriding Interest. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
I. Gannett AND Richmond Newspapers
One year to the day after its decision in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale,l which permitted the closure of pretrial hearings
in certain circumstances to members of the press and public,
the United States Supreme Court clarified and restricted its
holding in the case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia.2 In Richmond Newspapers the Court held that trial
courts could not close full trials to members of the press and
public except in the most unusual situations. The Court did
not expressly alter the Gannett holding, yet its majority opin-
ion and five concurrences sought to clarify some of the ambi-
guities of the earlier decision and to redirect its emphasis.
Richmond Newspapers must be read in the context of the
Gannett decision. The Virginia Supreme Court relied solely
on Gannett to uphold the trial court's closure of a murder
trial in the Richmond Newspapers case.
A. Gannett v. DePasquale
The issue presented in Gannett was whether members of
the press could be excluded from pretrial hearings on suppres-
sion of evidence when the defendant, the prosecutor and the
trial judge all agreed to the closure. In resolving this issue, the
Court found it necessary to decide whether the press and the
public have an independent right to insist on access to such
proceedings.3 The Court upheld the decision of a New York
court to exclude the press from such a hearing, and concluded
that the petitioner, a newspaper publisher, had no constitu-
1. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
3. Unless otherwise noted, references to the press are also presumed to refer to
the rights of the general public.
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tional right to demand access to the pretrial hearing.
In Gannett, a defense counsel moved that a pretrial sup-
pression hearing prior to a murder trial be closed to the public
because "the unabated buildup of adverse publicity had jeop-
ardized the ability of the defendants to receive a fair trial."'
The trial court closed the hearing, without objection from the
prosecutor and members of the press who were present. Gan-
nett Co., Inc. later moved the court to set aside its exclusion-
ary order. Trial court judge Daniel DePasquale held a hearing
on this motion but decided not to grant it. A transcript of the
closed hearing was furnished, but only after the defendants
had entered guilty pleas. The Appellate Division found the
exclusionary order to be an unlawful prior restraint on the
press that also transgressed the public interest in open judi-
cial proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division and upheld the trial court's ruling.5
Writing for the Supreme Court majority that affirmed the
court of appeals decision, Justice Stewart first noted that
judges have "an affirmative constitutional duty"" to minimize
the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. He then considered
whether the sixth amendment,7 either on its face or by incor-
poration of common-law rules, gave the press and public a
right to insist on access to judicial proceedings even when all
participants have agreed to closure.
Justice Stewart asserted that the sixth amendment right to
a public trial was a guarantee personal to the accused and not
for the public at large. While acknowledging a "strong societal
interst in public trials,"8 Stewart said that interest did not
4. 443 U.S. at 375.
5. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756
(1978).
6. 443 U.S. at 378. In support of his point, Justice Stewart cited Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), where the Court held that "trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused." Id. at 362.
Throughout his opinion Justice Stewart frequently cited not only to Sheppard, but
also to Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In Sheppard, the Court set standards to
regulate the conduct of court reporters who sensationalized the murder trial of Dr.
Sam Sheppard. In Estes, the Court set standards governing proper courtroom deco-
rum. Estes' trial was frequently disrupted by noisy cameras, clumsy cameramen and
reporters.
7. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial...."
8. 443 U.S. at 383.
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amount to a public right.9 He said that when closure was or-
dered, the public's interest would be fully protected by the
participants in the litigation.10
Justice Stewart and the other members of the majority
were not persuaded by the historical argument that the com-
mon-law presumption of open trials had been incorporated
into the sixth amendment in the form of a constitutional
right." Even if such a right were found, in the view of the
majority, it would not necessarily apply to pretrial proceed-
ings, since at common law such proceedings "were never char-
acterized by the same degree of openness as were actual
trials. 12
Except in his discussion of the historical argument, Justice
Stewart used the words "trial," "pretrial" and "criminal pro-
ceeding" interchangeably, even when stating the issue and the
rule. For instance, he stated .the holding of the case to be that
"members of the public have no constitutional right under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal tri-
als."1 3 This less than careful use of language led to confusion
as to what Gannett actually stood for.
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, White and Mar-
shall, Justice Blackmun stressed the English and American
common-law tradition of public trials.1 ' He argued that a
strong societal interest in open judicial proceedings militated
against interpreting the sixth amendment solely for the defen-
dant's benefit. He asserted that even if the amendment were
so interpreted, the defendant's right to demand a public trial
did not give him a right to compel a private trial.1 5 Justice
Blackmun concluded that the sixth amendment, as incorpo-
rated in the fourteenth, prohibited the states from excluding
the public from a proceeding within the sixth amendment's
guarantee "without affording full and fair consideration to the
9. Id.
10. Id. at 384.
11. Id. at 385-86.
12. Id. at 388.
13. Id. at 391.
14. Id. at 412.
15. Id. at 415-18. The majority took issue with the dissents approach, on the ba-
sis that the issue of defendant's right to compel a private trial was not presented by
the case. Id. at 382 n.11.
1981]
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public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding,"16 even
if the accused was the one who wanted closure.
Having decided that the sixth amendment gave no right of
access to criminal proceedings, the majority reserved the
question whether such a right was created by the first and
fourteenth amendments. Justice Stewart found it unnecessary
to decide this question because he found the trial judge's
actions consistent with any such right the petitioner might
have had.1
7
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell encouraged an ex-
plicit holding that the first amendment gave the press a right
of access to judicial proceedings, though this right was not un-
limited.18 In contrast, the dissenters denied that the Court
had ever found a right of access to governmental proceedings
based on the first amendment.19 However, based on the right
of access they found to be protected by the sixth amendment,
they stated that closure should be permitted only if the ac-
cused can show that it is "strictly and inescapably neces-
sary' 20 to protect his right to a fair trial.21
16. Id. at 433.
17. Id. at 392-93. Justice Stewart cited four facts about the Gannett case that
prompted the conclusion that no first amendment violation had occurred:
1. None of the spectators objected when the defendants moved for closure;
2. Counsel for the newspaper was given an opportunity to be heard;
3. The trial court believed that the press did have a right of access, but specifi-
cally found this right to be outweighed by the defendant's right to a fair trial;
and
4. A transcript of the suppression hearing was eventually made available.
Id.
18. Id. at 397. Justice Powell saw the press's right of access as deriving from its
status as an agent of the public. Limits on the right of access included, according to
Powell, "The constitutional right of defendants to a fair trial," id. at 398, and "the
needs of government to obtain just convictions and to preserve the confidentiality of
sensitive information and the identity of informants." Id. Justice Powell laid out a
number of factors trial courts should consider in deciding whether to close a court-
room, e.g., whether alternative means are available to preserve the fairness of the
trial. Id. at 398-401.
19. Id. at 411. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the dis-
sent in this respect. Id. at 404.
20. Id. at 440.
21. The dissenters thought that the accused seeking closure should be required to
demonstrate a substantial probability that: (1) irreparable damage to his fair-trial
right will result from a public proceeding; (2) alternatives to closure will not ade-
quately protect his chance for a fair trial; (3) closure will be effective in protecting
against the perceived harm. Where a member of the public contemporaneously ob-
jects to closure, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to state his objections.
[Vol. 64:717
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Both the dissenters and Chief Justice Burger in his con-
currence noted that most cases are disposed of at the pretrial
stage. This observation led Burger to conclude that only pre-
trial hearings could be closed to the public, and to emphasize
that the Court's holding should be limited to such hearings.2 2
In contrast, the fact that pretrial hearings often represent the
only opportunity for the public to view the judicial process led
the dissenters to decide that such hearings must be subject to
the same publicity constraints as a full trial.2
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist inter-
preted the majority's holding as being that "the public does
not have any Sixth Amendment right of access"'24 to a pretrial
hearing or a trial. Therefore, in his (Rehnquist's) opinion, the
trial court "is not required. . . to advance any reason whatso-
ever 2 5 for closing a courtroom.
B. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
Richmond Newspapers arose out of a murder trial which
was closed to the press and public by Richard H.C. Taylor, a
Virginia trial judge. When the Supreme Court reviewed the
case, it ruled that Gannett could not be applied so as to close
a criminal trial. The Court found a first amendment right of
the public to attend trials, and concluded that few circum-
stances would justify closure.
1. The Virginia Courts
Judge Taylor had excluded the press and public from the
entire murder trial of defendant John Paul Stevenson, appar-
ently relying on a Virginia statute that permitted closure in
some cases.26 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the stat-
ute's constitutionality and upheld the closure of the trial by
denying Richmond Newspapers' petition for appeal, citing
Id. at 440-46.
22. Id. at 397.
23. Id. at 433-39.
24. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. VA. CODE § 19.2-266 which provides in part- "In the trial of all criminal cases,
. . . the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose pres-
ence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to
a public trial shall not be violated."
1981]
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only Gannett in its one-paragraph order. It also published
the transcript of the closed deliberations concerning exclusion
of the public, which revealed, to the eventual harm of the
state, the informal process by which the closure decision was
made.
The trial in Richmond Newspapers was Stevenson's fourth
trial for the same murder charges. 28 Judge Taylor closed the
courtroom on the motion of Stevenson's counsel, who ex-
pressed concern that information would be "'shuffled back
and forth .. . as to what - who testified to what.' -129 The
prosecutor and two reporters present at the time did not ob-
ject to the closure.
Later, Richmond Newspapers moved to vacate the closure
order, and Judge Taylor held a closed hearing on the motion.
At the hearing, the paper's counsel pointed out that the judge
had made no evidentiary findings prior to entering his order,
and argued that the Constitution required the court decide
before ordering closure that the defendant's rights could be
protected in no other way. Stevenson's counsel mentioned
that this was the defendant's fourth trial and expressed con-
cern that information would "leak out," be reported by the
press, perhaps inaccurately, and be seen by the jurors.30
In outlining his rationale for continuing to exclude the
press, Judge Taylor emphasized the layout of the courtroom,
which he said made the presence of observers distracting to
the jury. Regarding protection of the. defendant, the judge
said: "'I feel that [if] the rights of the defendant are infringed
in any way, [when] he makes the motion to do something and
it doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else, then
27. 3 Med. L. Rptr. 1545. The decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, which was
not officially reported, only recited the facts of the case and dismissed the appeal in
one paragraph, citing Gannett.
28. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2818 (1980). Steven-
son was convicted of second-degree murder at his first trial, but the conviction was
reversed on the basis that a blood-stained shirt had been improperly admitted into
evidence. The second trial ended in a mistrial when a juror asked to be excused and
no alternate was available. The third trial also ended in a mistrial, apparently be-
cause a prospective juror who had read about the previous trial in the press had told
other prospective jurors about the case before the trial began.
29. Id. at 2819.
30. Id.
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I'm inclined to go along with the defendant's motion."' , The
eventual outcome of the closed trial was that the judge found
Stevenson not guilty after having granted a defense motion to
strike the prosecution's evidence.
2. Supreme Court Majority and Concurrences
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reversed the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers. Al-
though unable to agree on an opinion, seven members of the
Court concurred in the judgment, on the basis that the Vir-
ginia court's order violated the right of access to criminal tri-
als guaranteed the public and press by the first and four-
teenth amendments. Chief Justice Burger announced the
judgment of the Court, in an opinion joined by Justices White
and Stevens. The Chief Justice phrased the issue once broadly
and once narrowly: (1) "[W]hether the right of the public and
press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United
States Constitution, 3 2 and (2) "[W]hether a criminal trial it-
self may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request
of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is re-
quired to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial,
or that some other overriding consideration requires
closure."'s
Chief Justice Burger maintained that Richmond Newspa-
pers presented a question of first impression, since Gannett
had held only that the public and press had no affirmative
right of access to pretrial hearings." Based on a lengthy his-
torical review, the Chief Justice argued that the decision to
close Stevenson's trial ran against the grain of long-estab-
lished tradition - specifically, the common-law presumption
of open criminal trials.3 5
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2818.
33. Id. at 2821.
34. Id. The Chief Justice supported his narrow reading of Gannett by citing his
own concurring opinion in that case.
35. Id. at 2821-23. The opinion traced the evolution of open trials from a time
when attendance by townspeople was compulsory to when it became voluntary. At no
time, however, did the judge have discretion over attendance by the public.
1981]
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a. Constitutional Bases for a Right of Access
Chief Justice Burger concluded, based on his review of his-
tory, that "a presumption of openness inheres in the very na-
ture of a criminal trial under our system of justice. 36 Never-
theless, the Chief Justice acknowledged that Virginia was
correct in contending that neither the Constitution nor the
Bill of Rights contains any provision which by its terms guar-
antees the public a right to attend criminal trials. Burger re-
fused to accept Virginia's conclusion that no such right exists,
however. He pointed to a series of Court decisions which ac-
cepted certain implied "fundamental rights [which] even
though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized. . . as
indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. 37
The Chief Justice concluded that a right of public access to
trials was "implicit in the guarantee of the First Amend-
ment."' More specifically, he stated that "[iln guaranteeing
freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amend-
ment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend
trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees."39
The right to attend criminal trials was thereby added to the
catalogue of implied fundamental rights.4 °
Justice Stevens saw a similar basis for the public right. He
called Richmond Newspapers "a watershed case ' 41 which for
the first time recognized that access to information about the
operation of government, as well as communication of infor-
36. Id. at 2825.
37. Id. at 2829.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2827.
40. The right to travel interstate, the right to privacy and the right to vote in
state elections are some of the other rights that have been drawn under the umbrella
of constitutional protection because the Court has found them to be "implied" in a
specific provision of the Constitution, such as the first amendment or the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Richmond Newspapers majority cited sev-
eral reasons for finding attendance at open criminal trials to be an implied right: (1)
the Bill of Rights was enacted against the backdrop of a long history of trials being
presumptively open; (2) free speech carries with it some freedom to listen, and listen-
ing is frustrated when courthouse doors are shut; (3) first amendment rights should
be read broadly for their "common core purpose of assuring freedom of communica-
tion on matters relating to the functioning of government," id. at 2827; and (4) the
right of assembly is an equally fundamental right which would be frustrated by closed
trials.
41. Id. at 2830.
[Vol. 64:717
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mation and ideas, was protected by the first amendment.42
Justice Stevens stressed that the Court's holding was consis-
tent with and vindicated his 1978 dissent in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.,4' a case that involved restriction of press access
to an area of a jail where a prisoner had committed suicide. In
KQED, he had argued that such arbitrary restriction of the
sources of information violated the first amendment.
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan put criminal trials
in the category of "government information." In his concur-
ring opinion (joined by Justice Marshall), he expressed the
view that first amendment public access claims should be re-
solved based on historical practice and "the importance of ac-
cess to a particular governmental process in terms of the goals
of that process." Reviewing the history and functions of open
trials, Justice Brennan concluded that: "without more, agree-
ment of the trial judge and the parties cannot constitutionally
close a trial to the public.' 45
Justice Blackmun, author of the Gannett dissent, con-
curred in the judgment in Richmond Newspapers. While con-
tinuing to maintain that a right of public access to criminal
trials inheres in the sixth amendment, he stated that he was
"driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First
Amendment must provide some measure of protection for
public access to the trial.' 4
Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion in Gan-
nett, was the only Justice to assert that the right of access
applies to "civil as well as criminal"'47 proceedings. He offered
little justification for this position, citing mainly cases involv-
ing criminal trials in his concurring opinion.' 8
b. Gannett Criticized
Justice Blackmun began his concurring opinion by criticiz-
42. Id.
43. 438 U.S. 1, 19-40 (1978).
44. 100 S. Ct. at 2834.
45. Id. at 2832.
46. Id. at 2842.
47. Id. at 2840.
48. In his footnote to the sentence in which he included civil trials as protected,
Justice Stewart discussed only generalities relating to the applicability and signifi-
cance of the first amendment. Id. at 2840 n.2. In only one sentence did Justice Stew-
art further discuss open civil trials.
1981]
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ing Gannett for its faulty interpretation of legal history and
its ambiguity, which led to confused implementation by lower
courts." Justice White also suggested in his concurring opin-
ion that Richmond Newspapers was made necessary by a
sloppy Gannett opinion. 0 Noting that the talk of "trials" in
Gannett now seemed to have become dicta, Justice Blackmun
found the clarified Gannett holding to be "that there is no
Sixth Amendment right on the part of the public - or the
press - to an open hearing on a. motion to suppress."51
Justice Stevens argued that the Richmond Newspapers
decision was fully consistent with the "perfectly unambiguous
holding"52 in Gannett which he had supported. He stated that
"[t]he absence of any articulated reason for the closure order
is a sufficient basis for distinguishing this case"5 3 from
Gannett.
c. Limits on the Right of Access
Three Justices discussed limits on the right of access to
criminal trials. Chief Justice Burger said criminal trials must
remain open to the public "[a]bsent an overriding interest ar-
ticulated in findings." 54 Without explicitly defining "overrid-
ing interest," the Chief Justice drew an analogy to a govern-
ment's placing "reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions upon the use of its streets."'55 He cited earlier
cases, including Gannett, which acknowledged that preferen-
tial seating may sometimes be desirable for media representa-
tives.56 He also listed three criticisms of Judge Taylor's deci-
49. Id. at 2841. He criticized Chief Justice Burger for voting with the majority in
Gannett even though he was the only member of the five vote majority to specifically
limit the holding to pretrial proceedings. He felt the Chief Justice should have
dissented.
50. Id. at 2830.
51. Id. at 2842 (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun had some criticism of the
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers as well as of the Gannett opinion. For
instance, he noted that the opinion invoked a "veritable potpourri" of constitutional
sources for a right of access to trials - the various clauses of the first amendment,
the ninth amendment and penumbral guarantees from past cases. Id.
52. Id. at 2831 n.2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2830.
55. Id. at 2830 n.18.
56. Id. The members of the plurality agreed that the press should receive no spe-
cial treatment except on the basis of practical considerations, e.g., guaranteed seats in
[Vol. 64:717
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sion to close the Richmond trial, which gives some suggestion
of factors indicating that closure is not justified: "[T]he trial
judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was
made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the
need to ensure fairness; there was no recognition of any right
under the Constitution for the public or press to attend the
trial."57
Justices Stewart and Brennan agreed that a trial judge
may impose reasonable limitations on press use of courtrooms.
Justice Stewart noted that while a trial courtroom is a public
place, it must be quiet and orderly and has only a limited ca-
pacity.58 Justice Brennan stated that the public's first amend-
ment right of access was "subject to a degree of restraint dic-
tated by the nature of the information and countervailing
interests in security or confidentiality." '59 He refused to spell
out precisely what "countervailing interests" might suffice to
"reverse [the] presumption of openness,"60 but suggested "na-
tional security concern"6' about state secrets as one possibil-
ity. He also expressed the view that the Virginia statute on
which the closure was based in Richmond Newspapers was
unconstitutional because it allowed closure "at the unfettered
discretion of the judge and parties.16 2
d. Benefits of Open Trials
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan both stressed
the many benefits open trials provide. Such trials:
1. Assure the defendant a fair proceeding;
2. Demonstrate the fairness of the trial to the public, en-
couraging confidence in the judicial system and respect for
the law;
3. Educate the public and encourage discussion of govern-
mental affairs;
4. Discourage perjury, misconduct and decisions based on
secret bias;
potentially crowded courtrooms to ensure that information gets to the public.
57. Id. at 2829-30.
58. Id. at 2840.
59. Id. at 2833.
60. Id. at 2839.
61. Id. at 2839 n.24.
62. Id. at 2839.
1981]
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5. Provide an outlet for community concern, hostility and
emotion. 3
Justice Brennan noted that publicity acts as a "check and
balance" against possible abuses of power and attempts to
employ the courts as instruments of persecution." He ex-
pressed the view that all other checks are insufficient and in-
significant without publicity. 5
3. Dissenting Opinion
In the only dissent in the case, Justice Rehnquist ignored
most of the arguments in the various opinions supporting the
judgment. Finding no "provision in the Constitution [that]
may fairly be read to prohibit what the trial judge in the Vir-
ginia state court system did in this case,' 66 he was of the opin-
ion that the trial court's closure order was not subject to fur-
ther review by the Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist
criticized the Court's growing use of its power to "smother a
healthy pluralism 67 among the states, and stated that he
found it "basically unhealthy"' 8 for such power to be concen-
trated in "a small group of lawyers who have been appointed
to the Supreme Court." 9
11. Richmond Newspapers AND OTHER DECISIONs AFFECTING
AcCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Richmond Newspapers marked the first time the Supreme
Court had to rule on the specific question of excluding press
and public from criminal trials. However, it was not the first
time the Court had faced the broader issues of (a) access to
information under government control, (b) attempts to pre-
vent the press from publishing information already in its
hands and (c) courtroom decorum, reporting of sensitive court
proceedings and alternatives to exclusion of the press. The
Richmond Newspapers authors discussed a number of cases
dealing with each of these issues.
63. See 100 S. Ct. at 2823-25, 2837-39.
64. Id. at 2838.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2844.
67. Id. at 2843.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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A. Desirability of Unrestricted Press Access to
Information
The Supreme Court has consistently rebuffed any at-
tempts at strict government censorship, but a majority has
never held that first amendment rights are absolute.
Most courts that have dealt with the specific question of
restrictions on reporting of judicial proceedings have held that
the right to report deserves the highest protection.7 0 The lim-
its placed on the right to report have usually been narrowly
drawn. The general thought has been that court proceedings
themselves are important, that the public's right to know is
strong because of its interest in governmental matters and
that the history behind the first amendment, as well as its
subsequent construction, bar arbitrary and poorly thought out
fetters on the press.
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia" the
Court, in striking down a Virginia statute that prohibited re-
vealing proceedings of the state judicial review commission,
noted: "The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct
of judges are matters of utmost public concern.17 2 The Court
continued: "'[T]here is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that [First] Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs.' ",73
In re Oliver74 was a 1948 case in which a judge charged,
convicted and sentenced for contempt a man giving testimony
in a secret "one-man grand jury" investigation being con-
ducted by the judge under Michigan law. The Court stressed
that there was not "a single instance"7 5 of a closed trial in
history and that the judge's decision, made during the course
of a secret proceeding, was contrary to "[t]his nation's ac-
cepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an ac-
cused. . .. ,,,' The Court said that open trials constitute "a
safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instru-
70. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
71. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
72. Id. at 839.
73. Id. at 838, quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
74. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
75. Id. at 266.
76. Id.
19811
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ments of persecution."'7" Although Oliver admitted no limits
on press access, it still couched its ruling in terms of the rights
of the accused, as did the Gannett majority - explainable in
part because the petitioner was the defendant convicted in
the closed trial, not the excluded press. The Court concluded
that the accused had a right "to have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged. '7 8
Craig v. Harney"' is another case that is commonly quoted
on the value of open trials. There, the Court held that a re-
porter could not be found in contempt for writing stories that
conflicted with the judge's perception of what had occurred.
The Court concluded: "A trial is a public event. What tran-
spires in the court room is public property."80
Despite the fact that its ruling allowed restrictions on the
press, the Gannett majority also acknowledged that there is a
strong public interest in open trials. 1 The clear consensus of
cases dealing with "fair trials - free press" issues is that even
though the press can be limited in certain (usually clearly out-
lined) circumstances, the Court begins with a presumption of
maximum protection of the press in its role as conduit of in-
formation for the people.
Another type of "access to governmental information" case
involves nonjudicial governmental entities. Houchins v.
KQED, Inc. 2 synthesized the decisions in this area. In KQED,
the Court rejected the argument that, because conditions in
jails are matters of public importance, the public must have
access to such facilities.8 3 The case arose after reporters from
television station KQED were refused admittance to a jail for
77. Id. at 270.
78. Id. at 272.
79. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
80. Id. at 374.
81. For instance, the Court stated:
There can be no blinking the fact that there is a strong societal interest in
public trials. Openness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testi-
mony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony,
cause all trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and
generally give the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system.
443 U.S. at 383 (citation omitted).
82. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
83. Id. at 8-9 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 64:717
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the purpose of filming an area where a prisoner had commit-
ted suicide. The Court sought to distinguish the right of ac-
cess and the right to print. It said that the "right to receive
ideas and information is not the issue in this case""M and that
there was no "First Amendment guarantee of a right of access
to all sources of information within government control." 85
The Court concluded by stating that the "undoubted right to
gather news 'from any source by means within the law'...
affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment com-
pels others. . . to supply information." 86
Justice Stevens dissented in KQED, stating that a "core
objective" 7 of the first amendment was to protect the free
flow of information. An official prison policy of concealing in-
formation about prison conditions from the public "arbitrarily
cut[s] off the flow of information at its source"88 and abridges
first amendment freedoms. In his Richmond opinion, Justice
Stevens attempted to equate KQED to Richmond Newspa-
pers because, despite the differing circumstances, both cut the
press off from the source of information.8 9 By preventing the
printing of any kind of information, the restictions in both
cases can be seen as analogous to prior restraints.
B. Prior Restraints
A second type of freedom of the press case which the
Court has addressed concerns attempts to prevent the press
from printing information already in its hands. The major
cases decided in this area demonstrate that those attempting
to so restrain the press will have to meet a very heavy burden.
In Near v. Minnesota,90 Chief Justice Hughes established the
classic censorship test later followed in several cases. The
Court in Near held that a Minnesota pamphleteer could not
be censored absent proof of direct, immediate and irreparable
injury for which there was no alternative solution.9 1 Near's
84. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 11 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
87. Id. at 30 (dissenting opinion).
88. Id. at 38.
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2830-31.
90. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
91. Id.
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publications had criticized the enforcement of gambling laws
by Minneapolis police in articles replete with anti-Semitic
overtones.2 Classifying freedom of the press as a privilege and
immunity, the Court said press freedom was not absolute but
that the nuisance statute under which Near was charged with
"scandalous, and defamatory"93 speech was unconstitutional.
It also required that freedom of the press could only be lim-
ited when the press could be proved to be directly hindering a
war effort, inciting violence or overthrow of the government or
printing obscene matter.9 4
New York Times Co. v. United States,95 the "Pentagon
Papers" case, protected the right of the press to print any in-
formation it obtained - even if, as in the case of the Penta-
gon Papers, the information was classified and supplied by the
one who stole it.9 In terms of the Richmond Newspapers
analysis, the Times case is significant in that, so long as access
to information is shut off, the government is keeping the press
from printing material which it would otherwise have a right
to print. Banning reporters from the courtroom presents many
of the dangers that arise from classic prior restraints - news
managing, self-enforcement of restraints and deception. The
major limit on the applicability of the Times case to Rich-
mond Newspapers is that the former was not decided against
the sensitive backdrop of a defendant's rights, but against a
claim by the government of danger to national security.
In a case more factually akin to Richmond Newspapers, a
Nebraska trial judge had "gagged" reporters to prevent them
from writing anything about a multiple murder in a small
town unless accounts of the proceedings or developments in
the case were made directly to the reporters. In striking down
the gag order, the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart 7 acknowledged limits on the first amendment,
but said that "barriers to prior restraint remain high unless
we are to abandon what the Court has said for nearly a quar-
ter of our national existence and implied throughout all of
92. Id. at 703-04.
93. Id. at 703.
94. Id. at 716.
95. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
96. Id.
97. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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it." ' The Court stated that prior restraints "should have par-
ticular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings"9
and rejected efforts to have it balance the first and sixth
amendments. 100 This case was similar to Richmond News-
papers in that it was a murder trial which the trial court
feared would be difficult to try fairly, the court's conclusion as
to the impact of the reporting was speculative, and the judge
did not take into consideration any alternatives before re-
stricting the press.101
The Nebraska Press Court also criticized attempts to jus-
tify press exclusions by the argument that they were tempo-
rary. It said time was an important element in reporting the
news.102 This emphasis on the time element suggests that fur-
nishing a transcript of the proceedings should not be an ade-
quate substitute for allowing press access to the courtroom -
contrary to the approach taken in Gannett, where Judge
DePasquale's decision was sustained partly because a tran-
script was eventually furnished to reporters.
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court sought to distinguish
"gag" orders like that in Nebraska Press, where the press is
present but forbidden to print what it hears, from outright
exclusions of the press and public - where nothing can be
printed because nothing is known.0 3 Nevertheless, the lan-
guage of the Times Court was strict: "'Any system of prior
restraints comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.' "I" The Court placed the
"'heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint' "105 on the government's shoulders. The dis-
tinction between limiting access to information and issuing
98. Id. at 561.
99. Id. at 559.
100. Id. at 561.
101. Id. at 565.
102. Id. at 560-61.
103. In its amicus brief, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press ar-
gued that the two are practically indistinguishable because both prevent dissemina-
tion of important information - as opposed to allowing publication and then prose-
cuting (which would make the restraint no longer prior).
104. 403 U.S. at 714, quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963).
105. Id., quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971).
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"gag" orders lacks substance; in each case the practical result
is that timely information does not get to the public.
C. Courtroom Decorum and Alternatives to Closure
Two cases - Estes v. Texas'06 and Sheppard v. Max-
well' O7 - treated poor press conduct in reporting and gather-
ing information from criminal trials. Estes involved the use of
television cameras for live broadcasts of a criminal trial. The
Court overturned Estes' conviction because the televising -
some of which reached unsequestered jurors - was held to
infringe on the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 10 8 It urged absolute
fairness in jury trials, and held that the purpose of the sixth
amendment was to ensure fair treatment for the accused -
an argument given great weight in Gannett.0 9 However, Estes
did not bar reporters from the courtroom but simply barred
electronic equipment, though construction of a special area for
the equipment was later allowed. The Court held that the first
amendment was satisfied because reporters remained free to
attend and report about court proceedings." 0
The Sheppard case involved prolonged and extremely sen-
sational press coverage of a murder trial. The defendant's
elaborate alibi did not prevent conviction by the press, and
ultimately, by the court."" Like Estes, Sheppard focused in
part on courtroom decorum. The Court noted that "the court-
room and courthouse premises are subject to the control of
the court,"' 12 indicating that it was a judge's "duty to protect
[a defendant] from . . . inherently prejudicial publicity.""M
The Sheppard Court emphasized two factors later given great
106. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
107. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
108. Id. at 538, 542-44.
109. Id. at 538-39.
110. Id. at 541-42.
111. Well before the trial began, Dr. Sheppard had been called a "murderer" in
major Ohio newspapers. There were other abuses including the holding of a hearing
on the case at which Dr. Sheppard was made to testify in a packed gymnasium with-
out the benefit of counsel.
112. 384 U.S. at 358.
113. Id. at 363. Compare the Gannett Court's holding that Judge DePasquale
properly interpreted his affirmative duty to ensure fairness. Even though Gannett
involved a pretrial proceeding rather than a trial, the thought was that taking steps at
that stage to protect the defendant's rights would assure a fair trial later.
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weight in Gannett and Richmond Newspapers. First, Shep-
pard involved flagrant sensationalism by newspapers covering
the trial, in contrast to the creditable, restrained reporting in
Gannett and Richmond Newspapers. The other factor given
weight by the Sheppard Court was that the "judge never con-
sidered other means ' 114 of reducing prejudice. Gannett was
the only one of the four major Supreme Court cases (i.e., Ne-
braska Press, Sheppard, Gannett and Richmond Newspa-
pers) in which the trial court was shown to have specifically
considered alternatives to closure; it was also the only case in
which the trial judge's decision was sustained.
The Sheppard and Nebraska Press cases suggested the
following alternatives to closing trials to the press:
1. Opening instructions to the jury to ignore press coverage
during the trial and closing instructions to inadvertently ac-
quired information and decide only on the evidence. 1 5
2. Enforcement of courtroom decorum by "stricter rules gov-
erning the use of the courtroom by newsmen." 1' 6
3. Insulating witnesses.11 7
4. Change of venue.
5. Postponement of the trial.
6. Control over courtroom personnel and officers of the
court.
7. Use of voir dire.
8. Sequestration of juries.118
Other sources have suggested other alternatives to closing
the courtroom to the public and the press. These include: (1)
change of venire (selection of a new jury panel), (2) limited
closure to preserve the anonymity of minors or other wit-
nesses and (3) declaration of mistrial, new trial or reversal
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 9
114. 384 U.S. at 358.
115. Id. at 357-58 (by implication).
116. Id. at 358. One of these rules could be restricting the press to certain areas
within the court room. One problem in Sheppard was that reporters with tape re-
corders came close enough to hear the defendant's conversations with his attorney,
interfering with the attorney-client privilege.
117. Id. at 359.
118. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
119. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties
Union of Virginia as amici curiae in the Richmond Newspapers case, citing United
States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1963); Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d
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III. ANALYSIS
Considered in the context of press-related Supreme Court
decisions, Richmond Newspapers was a reasoned decision,
generally consistent with the mainstream of Court-made law.
In contrast, Gannett was an aberration whose many defects in
language and foresight exploded shortly after it was decided.
As noted by Justices White and Blackmun,120 Richmond
Newspapers was made necessary by Gannett. Analysis of
Richmond Newspapers should begin with consideration of the
ways in which it clarifies the earlier case and why such clarifi-
cation was necessary.
When it issued the Gannett decision on the last day of its
1978 term, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court anticipated
the number of closures in lower courts that would follow or
the ways in which aggressive defense attorneys, acquiescing
prosecutors and sympathetic judges would expand the deci-
sion. Within six weeks of the decision, the Reporters Commit-
tee for Freedom of the Press had counted fifty-one requests to
close courtrooms, more than half of which were granted.121 Af-
ter one year, the number of closures stood at 272 motions to
close, 160 motions granted.122
Examination of some of the closures shows that they went
far beyond the kind of case the Gannett Court had contem-
plated. An example is Richmond Newspapers itself. An objec-
tive interpretation of Gannett would indicate that pretrial
proceedings could be closed under certain circumstances. One
such circumstance, present in Gannett, was a finding that un-
due press attention might threaten the defendants' rights.1 28
151 (9th Cir. 1958) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 29, 33, 47, 48.
120. See concurring opinion of Justice White, 100 S. Ct. 2830, and opinion of Jus-
tice Blackmun concurring in the judgment, id. at 2841-42.
121. See amicus brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia at 12-13.
122. These totals come from an unpublished updating of the Court Watch Study
which was appended to the Reporters Committee amicus brief. The totals are not
comprehensive but include all the cases of which the Committee was aware.
123. 443 U.S. at 376. The finding that an open hearing would present an unac-
ceptable danger of prejudice was made despite the fact that the press coverage that
had occurred was not sensationalized. In his Gannett dissent, Justice Blackmun char-
acterized the coverage as "straightforward reporting," id. at 407, that was "placid,
routine, and innocuous," id., and comparatively infrequent. He noted that the stories
had contained no editorializing and only one picture. The majority did not dispute
the dissent's characterization of the press coverage, at least not explicitly.
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In contrast, the court in Richmond Newspapers was closed
during a trial, and the only justification given was the fear
that a third mistrial might result.124
In the year after it was handed down, other lower courts
also extended the Gannett decision, to exclude the press but
not the public, exclude the public but not the press and ex-
clude the press and public for reasons unrelated to prejudicial
publicity. 2 5 Groping for guidance in Gannett's cloudy lan-
guage and five opinions, the courts fashioned a wide variety of
standards for when closure was permissible. 26
Lower courts were encouraged to extend Gannett to clo-
sure of full trials by the interchanging of the words "pretrial"
Even press advocates might have trouble with Justice Blackmun's analysis, be-
cause his pica-by-pica appraisal seems to indicate that there is some threshold level
of sensationalism - or number of pictures - that a newspaper can reach, at which
point censorship or some form of official restraint might become acceptable.
124. 5 Med. L. Rptr. at 1548.
125. See the Reporters Committee amicus brief 13. The Court Watch Study in-
cluded in an appendix to the brief shows that there was no pattern to the kind of
circumstances in which disclosure was allowed. Wisconsin stood out as unusual, only
one pretrial and no trials being closed out of the twelve cases reported from the state.
At the other extreme, no reported requests for closure were denied in the Virginia
courts.
126. For example, two federal courts came up with two separate sets of standards
for closure. In United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 117 (3d Cir. 1979), the court
was concerned with the defendant's likelihood of success on the merits of an appeal
or petition for mandamus to reverse a district court order requiring that a sentencing
hearing stay open. In finding little likelihood of success on the merits, the court
looked at a number of features distinguishing the situation from Gannett: (1) the
prosecutor's agreement to bar the press in Gannett; (2) the finding in Gannett of a
reasonable possibility of prejudice; (3) the fact that Gannett involved a pretrial
rather than posttrial situation. The court also stressed the existence of alternative
ways to protect the defendant's rights.
In United States v. Powers, 477 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Iowa 1979), the court professed
itself unwilling to say it had no power to close a criminal trial, since exceptional cir-
cumstances might arise that could prevent the defendant from presenting his de-
fenses and thereby deny him a fair trial. Under the circumstances of the particular
case, however, the court found that the defendant seeking closure had failed to meet
his burden of establishing:
1. By clear and convincing evidence that there was a clear and present danger
of actual harm to the life of the defendant or a family member;
2. Consent to closure on the part of the prosecution as in Gannett or a compel-
ling reason for not requiring the prosecutor's consent;
3. By clear and convincing evidence that closure would prevent the harm; and
4. By clear and convincing evidence that there were no alternatives to complete
closure of the criminal trial.
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and "trial" throughout the opinion.127 Of all the separate
opinions in the case, only Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
was specifically limited to pretrials.12 This in fact added to
the lower courts' confusion by suggesting that the majority
opinion must have been broader if the Chief Justice explicitly
limited his concurrence in such a way.
Another major defect in Gannett, not dealt with in Rich-
mond Newspapers, was the suggestion that prosecutors and
other participants in the litigation would protect the public
interest in open trials.129 The Reporters Committee study
found that in most cases the prosecution took no position at
all regarding closure; occasionally the prosecutor supported
closure, and only rarely opposed it. 5 0 Some commentators
took the position that it was unrealistic to expect the prosecu-
tor to act as sole protector of the public interest with respect
to closure of courtrooms.'
At least from the viewpoint of those sympathetic to the
press, Gannett caused additional harm by the grudging tone it
adopted toward the public interest in open trials. By such
statments as "[W]e certainly do not disparage the general de-
sirability of open judicial proceeding,' 13 2 the Court seemed al-
most reluctant in its acknowledgement of the strictures of the
Constitution. This carried implications that requests to close
courtrooms were to be regarded with leniency rather than
suspicion.
One final indication that the Gannett decision was ill con-
sidered is the fact that five justices took the unusual step of
publicly clarifying it within several weeks of its being issued.
127. The majority, dissent, and most of the concurrences interchanged the words
at some point. Most harmful and confusing, however, was the majority's statement of
the holding: "For these reasons, we hold that members of the public have no constitu-
tional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials."
443 U.S. at 391.
128. 443 U.S. at 394-97.
129. See 443 U.S. at 383.
130. See amicus brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia at 14.
131. See, e.g., amicus brief of American Civil Liberties Union in Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia at 29. See also Kirkpatrick, Public Right Denied When Court
Shuts Out Press, Milwaukee J., Sept. 23, 1979, part 1 at col. 3. Kirkpatrick argued:
"Deals can be cut, pleas bargained and truthful evidence ruled inadmissible" in pre-
trials as well as trials. Id.
132. 443 U.S. at 393.
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While Justice Stevens chided critics of Gannett for "over-
reacting," 133 Justice Powell explained the decision in detail
and Chief Justice Burger said that those who interpreted it
more broadly than he did in his concurrence (that is, as appli-
cable only to pretrial proceedings) may have been extending it
too far.134
Richmond Newspaper's direct effect on Gannett consisted
of the important clarification that, though pretrials may be
closed, trials may hardly ever be closed and certainly not
under Gannett's standards. Though limited, this clarification
was valuable because it resolved the ambiguous language in
Gannett in favor of open trials. It established a strong pre-
sumption that trials should not be closed and encouraged a
similar presumption with respect to governmental institutions
in general. Though Richmond Newspapers, like Gannett, ad-
mitted that closure might be permitted in some circum-
stances, its limiting phrases - Burger's "overriding inter-
est" '135 and Brennan's "rare and stringent exceptions"1 3 -
sounded strict even though no specific standards were
proposed.
This stricter language suggests another significant contri-
bution made by Richmond Newspapers: a shift in emphasis
back toward an embracing of open proceedings rather than a
grudging tolerance of them. Richmond Newspapers appears
to have brought the Court back to the view of Murphy v.
Florida37 that publicity does not automatically mean an un-
fair trial.1 38 While there is no proof that Gannett's less-than-
supportive attitude toward open proceedings encouraged clo-
sure, it certainly did not discourage defense attorneys from
taking their chances with motions to close or judges from
granting such motions.
Despite its positive contributions, Richmond Newspapers
did not solve the problem of closure of judicial proceedings. It
did not - logically could not - alter Gannett's acceptance of
133. Milwaukee J., Sept. 9, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
134. Milwaukee J., Aug. 14, 1979, § 1, at 9, col. 5; Milwaukee J., Aug. 9, 1979, § 1,
at 3, col. 2.
135. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
136. Id. at 2832.
137. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
138. Id. at 799.
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pretrial closure or its standards for closure, unclear as they
are. Therefore, much of the confusion that followed Gannett
remains, except that it is clear that Gannett can not be ex-
tended to support closing an entire criminal trial to the press.
Both Gannett and Richmond Newspapers ignored a strong
precedent. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart3 9 was the
most applicable earlier case because it had similar facts - a
sensational murder trialand a desire to restrict press coverage
to protect a defendant. Gannett (and the Virginia courts in
Richmond Newspapers) allowed closure based solely on pub-
licity, the adverse effect of which was only speculative. Ne-
braska Press specifically prohibited this.140 Gannett also al-
lowed a transcript to be substituted for an open proceeding,14 1
which Nebraska Press had not allowed, and ignored the alter-
native to closure set out in the earlier case. While Richmond
Newspapers suggested that considerations of alternatives was
important,14 2 the Court did not expressly reaffirm those alter-
natives given in Nebraska Press or synthesize a new list from
the alternatives that different decisions have listed. In short,
both the Gannett and Richmond Newspapers Courts could
have avoided striking into new areas of the law by relying on
Nebraska Press as a precedent. Although the earlier case in-
volved a "gag" order rather than a denial of access to a pro-
ceeding, both are, in effect, prior restraints on the press,
which have the practical result that timely information does
not reach the public.
Gannett and Richmond Newspapers also ignored the Near
and New York Times tests previously set out,143 acknowledg-
ing the general "presumption" against closed proceedings but
ignoring the steps the cases set out to determine whether clo-
sure should be allowed. Factual differences between the cases
were not so great that the two earlier decisions should not
139. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
140. Id. at 565.
141. 443 U.S. at 393.
142. See Chief Justice Burger's discussion of the trial judge's failure to consider
alternatives, 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30. The importance of reviewing alternatives to clo-
sure is apparent from the fact that, of the four trial judges in recent major cases
(Gannett, Richmond Newspapers, Sheppard and Nebraska Press), only the judge
who explicitly considered alternatives (DePasquale in Gannett) was sustained.
143. See notes 90-96 supra and accompanying text.
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have been applied.
Richmond Newspapers can be criticized on other counts as
well. Those who favor restrictions on the press may dislike its
emphasis on open criminal proceedings, yet press advocates
may view it as too narrow - a "don't" decision that outlaws
closures in cases of clear abuse but does not set strict, high
standards by which future attempts to close criminal trials or
to deny the press access to government information can be
judged. This failure to establish clear standards is one of the
decision's greatest faults.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press pro-
posed three standards for closure: proof of a direct and imme-
diate injury to justice, proof of irreparable injury and a show-
ing that no other reasonable alternatives were available that
could prevent the injury.1 44 A reasonable opportunity to be
heard should also be afforded.1 45 While this rule is favorable
to reporters, it illustrates the kind of course the Court could
have taken. It does not rob the lower courts of the authority
to make individual determinations, but it relies on precedent
to set standards for review that should eliminate the uncer-
tainty that followed Gannett.
In summary, although Richmond Newspapers' unmistaka-
ble emphasis on the openness of trials and its clarifications of
Gannett are worthy, it failed to send a sufficiently clear signal
to the lower courts regarding standards for closure. 4 e The
Chief Justice came closest to implicitly setting standards
when he listed the errors at the trial level that made it neces-
sary to overturn the decision: (1) there were no findings to
support closure; (2) there was no inquiry as to alternatives;
and (3) there was no recognition of the press's right to attend
144. Amicus brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia at 28. These are essentially the Near and New York
Times criteria.
145. Id.
146. Officials affiliated with the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
reported that in the six weeks following the Richmond Newspapers decision, they
noticed no significant change in the number or kind of closings being reported to
them. While the officials cautioned that it was still close to the issuance of the deci-
sion, a clear trend in the direction of closing courtrooms had appeared within six
weeks of the Gannett decison. Officials also noted cases in which reporters had ar-
gued that judges should read Gannett together with Richmond Newspapers and fash-
ion a stricter rule for closing of pretrial proceedings.
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criminal trials.147
As the multiple opinions in Richmond Newspapers reflect,
the Court is sharply divided as to the locus of the right the
majority agreed upon. While Justice Blackmun continued to
maintain that the right is "explicitly placed" 118 in the sixth
amendment, Justice Stevens based it on the first amendment,
asserting that the sixth amendment gave rights only to the
accused.149 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist denied that the as-
serted right of access could be found in any provision of the
Constitution. 50
While Justice Rehnquist's dissent has validity from a strict
point of view, it ignores the "implied rights" the Court has
added under the constitutional umbrella. Once these implied
rights are admitted, other rights are implicitly demeaned
when left on lower plateaus. The rights to travel and to abor-
tion, both of which have been found to be "implied" in the
Constitution,151 should not be given greater constitutional
protection than the right of the press to attend criminal trials.
The latter comes much closer to being a right explicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution.
The source of the right of access to trials can be found in
the public's right to receive information, which is protected by
the first amendment.1 52 Seen in this light, restrictions on the
press - whether in the form of "gag" orders or exclusionary
orders - are obviously restrictions on the public's agent for
obtaining information. When the press is excluded, it becomes
clear how far removed the great mass of the public is from
147. 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30. The Chief Justice did not present these factors as a
checklist for trial judges, but his stress on them indicates that without at least these
three considerations a closure could not be upheld.
148. Id. at 2842. Justice Blackmun said he agreed to base the decision on the first
amendment only as a secondary position.
149. Id. at 2831 n.2.
150. Id. at 2843-44.
151. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to interna-
tional travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to interstate
travel); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to abortion).
152. In a dissenting opinion in Saxbe v. Washington Post, Justice Powell noted
"An informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media.
No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent dis-
charge of his political responsibilities .... In seeking out the news, the press there-
fore acts as an agent of the public at large" and to deny the press right to receive
information is to effectively deny that right to the public. 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1975).
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day-to-day scrutiny of government and how easily news could
be managed simply by cutting it off at the source. Whether
openness is considered necessary as a check on government
abuse or as an educational tool, neither goal can be accom-
plished when people (through the press) are shut off from ob-
serving (and therefore analyzing and criticizing) government
functions.
It must be emphasized that it was a responsible, though
aggressive, press that was excluded in both Gannett and Rich-
mond Newspapers. While defendants might argue that the
simple presence of even a calm and restrained press threatens
their fair trial rights, a broad rule that excludes a responsible
press on the speculation153 that its routine reporting might
harm a defendant is much more restrictive than the first
amendment should admit.
Pretrial closures will continue because Richmond Newspa-
pers could not that greatly alter Gannett, but even this is un-
fortunate for two reasons. First, the Gannett standards re-
main vague and open to inconsistent trial court
interpretation, and second, pretrials often really have become
trials. As Chief Justice Burger noted in his Gannett concur-
rence, in the entire pretrial period, there is no certainty that a
trial will take place.154 With many pretrials becoming de facto
trials, the public interest in them is comparable to that in for-
mal trials themselves, and the press should be equally pro-
tected in attending them, save for the truly unusual cases in
which sensitive material is being treated.
Three other factors will remain significant in judging fu-
ture cases in this area:
1. Judicial conduct. Without expressly saying so, the
Court indicated its disapproval of Judge Taylor in Virginia
and its confidence in Judge DePasquale in New York. Judge
Taylor's systemless approach to closing a trial (without even
passing acknowledgement of the press's right to attend) no
doubt made it easier to overturn his decision. In contrast, the
fact that Judge DePasquale acknowledged a strong right of
153. As noted earlier, the Nebraska Press case specifically prohibited closure
based on publicity, the adverse effect of which was only speculative. 427 U.S. at 565.
See note 141 and accompanying text supra.
154. 443 U.S. at 397.
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press access, but seemed carefully to weigh conflicting argu-
ments and evidence before ruling, appeared to make the
Court less willing to disturb his ruling.
2. Consideration of alternatives. The three judges in major
Supreme Court cases who did not consider alternatives to clo-
sure have been overruled.185 The Court seems to think alter-
natives should be investigated, even if it is reluctant to supply
a list of those that should be considered.
3. Reporters' conduct. When the initial motion for closure
was made in both Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, the
reporters present failed to object. Several Justices spoke of
their great reluctance to disturb rulings to which there had
been no timely objection. In most cases surveyed by the Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the reporters
present did not initially object.156 Clearly many reporters have
not been aware of developments in this area of the law or
have been unsure of their standing to object. Although it is
unreasonable for courts to expect reporters to have legal
knowledge beyond that possessed by lay people who routinely
appear in court, reporters can best ensure that courtrooms
will not be arbitrarily closed by objecting at the time the clo-
sure motion is made and requesting that the judge state a rea-
son for closing the courtroom.
LAWRENCE J. MORRIS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination-Truthful Statements May Be Used in
a Perjury Prosecution. United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115 (1980). Two basic legal concepts sometimes
155. Each of the trial court judges in Sheppard, Nebraska Press and Richmond
Newspapers failed to consider alternatives to closure and each was overturned. While
the Court did not in Richmond Newspapers specifically point to the failure of Judge
Taylor to consider alternatives to closure, there appears to be a pattern that the
Court is more lenient when alternatives are considered (e.g., Gannett) than when
they are not.
156. Court Watch Study, Spring 1980.
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